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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court's unanimous ruling in Matal v. Tam is a
landmark decision regarding the intersection between free speech and trademark
law.2 Addressing whether trademarks can legitimately be barred from federal
trademark protection under the Lanham Act based solely on their possible
disparaging content, the litigation involving an Asian-American band that sought
to register the name, "The Slants," brought this important interplay into stark
relief.3 Writing in bold strokes, Justice Alito's opinion holds that the Lanham
Act's prohibition on disparaging marks, 15 U.S.C. 51052(a), violates the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment.4  "It offends a bedrock First
Amendment principle: Speech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses
ideas that offend."5 Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion (which was joined by
three other Justices) also broadly states: "the viewpoint discrimination rationale
renders unnecessary any extended treatment of other questions raised by the
parties."
'6
The Court's categorically worded decision will have important implications
for both the First Amendment and for trademark law for years to come. The
question is thus how far does the Tam decision reach, and whether it will upend
major aspects of trademark law. This article provides an analysis of the
implications of Tam for trademark law, both in terms of eligibility for registration
and in terms of the scope of trademark protection. The article takes the view
that Court correctly found the prohibition on registration of disparaging marks
to be contrary to fundamental principles of free speech, and that its analysis
should apply directly to the similar blanket prohibitions on registering immoral
or scandalous content. The article suggests ways in which these provisions could
be revised or narrowed to satisfy First Amendment scrutiny.
In contrast to the Lanham Act provisions that are now plainly
unconstitutional, other prohibitions found in the Lanham Act, which preclude
deceptive, confusingly similar, and functional marks, can be defended based
upon traditional trademark principles that are consistent with robust First
Amendment protections for free speech. This article contends that First
Amendment principles do allow for most of the statutory limitations placed on
trademark registration, and that - contrary to the predictions of some
commentators - the ruling will not cause any significant disruption in the large
majority of trademark cases. It is true, however, as at least one court has now
2 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
3 See Our Story, http://www.theslants.com/biography/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2018).
4 SeegeneralyMatal, 137 S. Ct. 1744.
5 Id. at 1751.
6 Id. at 1765.
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held, that the Lanham Act rules against immoral, scandalous, and disparaging
marks must be completely reevaluated based on free speech considerations.
Finally, the article addresses whether Tam might eventually alter the extent to
which the scope of protection trademark owners receive based on their ability to
prevent confusingly similar uses and to prevent dilution by tarnishment or
blurring might be subject to challenge under the First Amendment. The article
finds that claims by trademark owners based on consumer confusion or dilution
should generally be unaffected by the Supreme Court's decision in Tam.
II. BACKGROUND
A. U.S. TRADEMARK LAW
The Lanham Act was enacted to provide a nationwide system for the
registration and protection of trademarks.7 The law was designed to "protect the
public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular
trademark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for and
wants to get."8 In addition, the law enables trademark owners to protect their
investment from misappropriation by free riders.9 "By applying a trademark to
goods produced by one other than the trademark's owner, the infringer deprives
the owner of the goodwill which he spent energy, time, and money to obtain. At
the same time, the infringer deprives consumers of their ability to distinguish
among the goods of competing manufacturers."'0 Section 2 of the Lanham Act
identifies marks that are ineligible for registration on the principal register-the
fundamental avenue by which marks are protected under federal trademark law."1
An extended discussion of the history of the Lanham Act's blanket
prohibition on the registration of "scandalous" or "immoral" marks can be
found in the ruling In re Old Glogy Condom Corp.12 There have been only a few
recent reported cases, for example, In re Wilcber Corp., which affirmed the refusal
to register the mark "Dick Heads" and the accompanying logo for restaurant and
bar services.
13
7 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 782 n.15 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (quoting S.Rep. No. 791333, at 3 (1946)).
8 Id.
9 Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 n.14 (1982).
10 Id. (citations omitted).
11 Section 2(a) states: "No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be
distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register
on account of its nature unless it-(a) [c]onsists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or
scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons,
living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or
disrepute." 15 U.S.C.A. § 1052 (West).
12 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216 (T.T.A.B. 1993).
13 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1929 (T.T.A.B. 1996),
2019]
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The Federal Circuit's ruling in In re Mavety Media Group, Ltd. sets forth the
standard for refusals to register marks on the ground that they are immoral or
scandalous.14 The court stated:
We therefore leave for another day the resolution of whether a
standard dictionary definition and an accompanying editorial
designation of vulgarity alone sufficiently demonstrates that a
substantial composite of the general public considers that word
scandalous, and consequently, whether the PTO may refuse
under § 1052(a) to register a mark based solely on such standard
dictionary evidence. Of course, the PTO may discharge its
burden of proving that Mavety's mark BLACK TAIL is
scandalous under 5 1052(a) through evidence such as consumer
surveys regarding the substantial composite of the general public.
However, we note the view of our predecessor court that the §
1052(a) prohibition against scandalous marks is not "an attempt
to legislate morality, but, rather, a judgment by the Congress that
such marks not occupy the time, services, and use of funds of
the federal government." McGinley, 660 F.2d at 486, 211 USPQ
at 674. We therefore commend the practice adopted by the
Board in another case to resolve the issue whether a mark
comprises scandalous matter under 5 1052(a) "in favor of [the]
applicant and pass the mark for publication with the knowledge
that if a group does find the mark to be scandalous ... , an
opposition proceeding can be brought and a more complete
record can be established.".. .Moreover, the Board has held that
under 15 U.S.C. § 1063(a) (1988), any person who believes that he
would be damaged by registration of a mark upon the principal
register, thus including interested members of the composite of
the general public, has standing to challenge registration in an
opposition proceeding... Indeed, such a procedure establishes a
meaningful opportunity for response by the applicant with
evidence that a substantial composite of the general public would
not consider the mark at issue scandalous in the context of
contemporary attitudes and the relevant marketplace.
15
These decisions ultimately turn on cultural imperatives and taboos, as sensed
by the decision-makers (appellate judges, the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board,
and initially the examiner). The formerly guiding trademark law principles to be
14 33 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1994),
15 Id. at 1374.
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discerned from the cases at issue in this article-subject now to First
Amendment review and reassessment-are: (1) that trademarks may not be
registered under federal law if they are scandalous or immoral (however defined
from time to time); and (2) that they may be cancelled if they are or have become
offensive to a substantial composite of the general public.
Under the Lanham Act, marks can be precluded from registration on grounds
of offensiveness.16 For example, decades-old litigation involving the Washington
Redskins' trademarks, addressing whether the registrations for those marks
should be cancelled as disparaging toward Native Americans, was effectively
resolved by the ruling in Matal v. Tam.17 In Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F.
Supp. 3d 439 (E.D. Va. 2015), the district court rejected the First Amendment
arguments and held that the Redskins trademarks may disparage Native
Americans and thus were subject to cancellation under then-governing
precedent.8  Pro-Football, Inc. appealed these decisions, and litigation
concerning the Washington Redskins marks continued to proceed through the
courts.
19
The Federal Circuit has identified some of the marks that have been denied
the benefit of trademark protection on grounds of disparagement. They run the
gamut:
REDSKINS;20 STOP THE ISLAMISATION OF AMERICA;2
1
THE CHRISTIAN PROSTITUTE (2013); AMISHHOMO
(2013); MORMON WHISKEY (2012); KHORAN FOR
WINE;22 HAVE YOU HEARD THAT SATAN IS A
REPUBLICAN? (2010); RIDE HARD RETARD (2009);
16 15 U.S.C.A. § 1052(a) (West).
17 See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
18 See also Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1828 (T.T.A.B. 1994) (denying motion
to dismiss suit to cancel registration of Washington Redskins trademark on the ground that it
disparages Native Americans and striking defenses based on secondary meaning and equitable
considerations), laterproceeding, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (T.T.A.B. 1999) (finding certain marks to
be disparaging and may bring Native Americans into contempt or disrepute).
19 See Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 415 F.3d 44 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (reversing grant of summary
judgment to team based on laches defense and remanding for further consideration). See also
Catherine MC. Farrelly, Supreme Court Denies Certiorari in Trademark Challenge to
Washington Redskins Name, Gibbons IP Law Alert (Jan. 12, 2010), https://
www.iplawalert.com/2010/01 / 12/Supreme-Court-denies-certioriari-in-trademark-challenge-
to-washington-redskins-name/.
20 Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, No. 1-14-CV-01043-GBL-IOD, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439,
2015 WL 4096277 (E.D.Va. 2015) (2014 PTO cancellation determination currently on appeal
in Fourth Circuit).
21 In re Geller, 751 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
22 In re Lebanese Arak Corp., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d 1215 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 4, 2010).
20191
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ABORT THE REPUBLICANS (2009); HEEB;2
3 SEX ROD;24
MARRIAGE IS FOR FAGS (2008); DEMOCRATS
SHOULDN'T BREED (2007); REPUBLICANS SHOULDN'T
BREED (2007); 2 DYKE MINIMUM (2007); WET BAC/WET
B.A.C. (2007); URBAN INJUN (2007); SQUAW VALLEY;
25
DON'T BE A WET BACK (2006); FAGDOG (2003);
N.I.G.G.A. NATURALLY INTELLIGENT GOD GIFTED
AFRICANS (1996); a mark depicting a defecating dog;26 an
image consisting of the national symbol of the Soviet Union with
an "X" over it;27 DOUGH-BOY for "a prophylactic preparation
for the prevention of venereal diseases.
28
As the Federal Circuit noted, there is no common law antecedent or precedent
for the disparagement prohibition, which was put into place when the Lanham
Act was enacted in 1946; immoral and scandalous marks were barred in the 1905
statute.29 The initial decision regarding whether a mark is disparaging under 5
2(a) is made by a single trademark examiner, applying the following test:
(1) What is the likely meaning of the matter in question, taking
into account not only dictionary definitions, but also the
relationship of the matter to the other elements in the mark, the
nature of the goods or services, and the manner in which the
mark is used in the marketplace in connection with the goods or
services; and
(2) If that meaning is found to refer to identifiable persons,
institutions, beliefs or national symbols, whether that meaning
may be disparaging to a substantial composite of the referenced
group.
30
23 In re Heeb Media, LLC, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1071 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 26, 2008).
24 Bos. Red Sox Baseball Club L.P. v. Sherman, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d 1581 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 9,2008)
(sustaining an opposition on multiple grounds, including disparagement).
25 In re Squaw Valley Dev. Co., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d 1264 (T.T.A.B. June 2, 2006)
26 Greyhound Corp. v. Both Worlds, Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1635 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 30, 1988)
(found to disparage Greyhound's trademarked running dog logo).
27 In re Anti-Communist World Freedom Cong., Inc., 161 U.S.P.Q. 304 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 24,
1969).
28 Doughboy Indus., Inc. v. Reese Chem. Co., 88 U.S.P.Q. 227 (T.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 1951).
29 In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1330.
30 Trademark Manual of Exam. Proc. ("TMEP
' ) 5 1203.03(b)(i).
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As the Federal Circuit noted, a "single examiner, with no input from her
supervisor, can reject a mark as disparaging by determining that it would be
disparaging to a substantial composite of the referenced group. '31 Though this
decision is subject to review if the trademark applicant seeks to appeal, it sets a
troubling pattern from a free speech perspective.
B. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S RULING ON THE FREE SPEECH/TRADEMARK
INTERSECTION
In re Tam, as the case was known at the Federal Circuit level, involved an
Asian-American band known as the "Slants." Applying strict scrutiny (which
requires that the prohibition is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
governmental interest) to what it viewed as a content-based and view-point based
rule, Judge Moore's Federal Circuit en banc majority opinion found that the
prohibition on disparaging marks was not simply a regulation of commercial
speech, given that it sought to regulate expressive components of the band's
speech.32 Rather, the court held that the prohibition placed a significant chill and
burden on private free speech by denying trademark registration on the basis of
viewpoint.33 Finally, the court found that even if the prohibition was deemed a
regulation of commercial speech, there was no substantial governmental interest
in regulating disparaging speech24
Tam and his bandmates formed an Asian-American dance-rock band in
2006, selecting "The Slants" as the name for the group. Tam sought to "reclaim"
and "take ownership" of Asian stereotypes and childhood slurs by making use
of this term for his band.35 The band's album tides include "The Yellow Album"
and "Slanted Eyes, Slanted Hearts," reflecting the band's belief "that Asians
should be proud of their cultural heritage, and not be offended by stereotypical
descriptions."36 When Tam sought to register the mark, the examiner deemed it
disparaging to "persons of Asian descent" because of the term's "long history of
being used to deride and mock a physical feature" of people of Asian descent.37
Tam appealed to the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board, which affirmed the
refusal to register the mark; the Board concluded that the mark was disparaging
to a substantial component of people of Asian descent.38 It based its decision
on dictionary definitions, reference works, review of the band's website and
31 In reTam, 808 F.3d at 1331.
32 808 F.3d 1321, 1334-1335 (Fed. Cit. 2015).
33 Id. at 1336-39.
34 Id. at 1355-1357.
35 Id. at 1331.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 1331-32.
38 In re Tam, No. 85472044, 2013 WL 5498164, at *5-7 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 26, 2013).
2019]
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statements recognizing that the term was a stereotype, and evidence that
members of the Asian community objected to the use of the word "Slants.
39
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the original panel hearing the case affirmed
the conclusion that the mark was disparaging.4° The panel opinion rejected
Tam's constitutional challenge because it was bound by prior precedent (from
the Federal Circuit's predecessor court) that First Amendment concerns were
not implicated by a refusal to register a trademark because the trademark owner
could still make use of the mark.41 That prior precedent, In re McGinley, 660 F.2d
481, 484 (C.C.P.A.'1981), analysis consisted of the following: "With respect to
appellant's First Amendment rights, it is clear that the PTO's refusal to register
appellant's mark does not affect his right to use it. No conduct is proscribed, and
no tangible form of expression is suppressed. Consequently, appellant's First
Amendment rights would not be abridged by the refusal to register his mark.
42
As the Federal Circuit en banc opinion noted, it was appropriate to reconsider
McGinley in light of the passage of time, the cursory nature of the reasoning in
the 1981 ruling, the lack of citation to precedent, and the changing (and
broadening) scope of First Amendment protection over several decades.
43 The
Federal Circuit concluded that the disparagement provision of the Lanham Act
is unconstitutional because it violates the First Amendment.44 The court applied
strict scrutiny to what it viewed as a content- and viewpoint-based rule:
It is beyond dispute that § 2(a) discriminates on the basis of
content in the sense that it "applies to particular speech because
of the topic discussed." Reed, 135 S.Ct. at 2227. Section 2(a)
prevents the registration of disparaging marks-it cannot
reasonably be argued that this is not a content-based restriction
or that it is a content-neutral regulation of speech. And the test
for disparagement-whether a substantial composite of the
referenced group would find the mark disparaging-makes clear
that it is the nature of the message conveyed by the speech which
is being regulated. If the mark is found disparaging by the
39 Id.
40 In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 570-71 (Fed. Cir. 2015), rehg en bancgranted, opinion vacated, 600
Fed. Appx. 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
41 Id. at 572-73.
42 Id. at 573.
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referenced group, it is denied registration. "Listeners' reaction to
speech is not a content-neutral basis for regulation. '45
Moreover, the court noted that the prohibition discriminates not just on the
basis of topic, but also its specific message or viewpoint: "It also discriminates
on the basis of message conveyed, 'the idea or message expressed'; it targets
'viewpoints [in] the marketplace.' It does so as a matter of avowed and
undeniable purpose, and it does so on its face."46 The court noted that the
government's own arguments attempting to defend the prohibition explicitly
concede its antipathy to the supposed message of Tam's mark: "Underscoring
its hostility to these messages, the government repeatedly asserts in its briefing
before this court that it ought to be able to prevent the registration of 'the most
vile racial epithets and images,' and 'to dissociate itself from speech it finds
odious.'' 47 So too, the legislative history shows a similar purpose on the part of
Congress.48
Judge Moore's carefully thought out Federal Circuit en banc majority opinion
found that the prohibition on disparaging marks was not simply a regulation of
commercial speech, given that it sought to regulate expressive components of
the band's speech. The court noted: "The government cannot escape strict
scrutiny by arguing that 2(a) regulates commercial speech. True, trademarks
identify the source of a product or service .... But they very commonly do much
more than that. And, critically, it is always a mark's expressive character, not its
ability to serve as a source identifier, that is the basis for the disparagement
exclusion from registration. The disparagement provision must be assessed
under First Amendment standards applicable to what it targets, which is not the
commercial-speech function of the mark. '49 On the facts, the court noted that
Tam's mark is inherently expressive: "Tam makes a statement about racial and
ethnic identity. He seeks to shift the meaning of, and thereby reclaim, an
emotionally charged word. He advocates for social change and challenges
perceptions of people of Asian descent. His band name pushes people. It
offends."50
The commercial nature of a trademark does not preclude consideration of
the expressive nature of this speech: "That the speech is used in commerce or
has a commercial component should not change the inquiry when the
government regulation is entirely directed to the expressive component of the
speech. This is not a government regulation aimed at the commercial component
45 In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1335 (quoting Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S.
123, 134, 112 S.Ct. 2395, 120 L.Ed.2d 101 (1992)).
46 Id. (quoting Reed, 135 S.Ct. at 2227; Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 116).
47 Id. at 1336 (citing government brief).
48 Id.
49 Id. at 1337-38
50 Id. at 1338.
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of speech."'s Rather, the Federal Circuit held that the prohibition placed a
significant chill and burden on private free speech by denying trademark
registration on the basis of viewpoint.5 2 There was no argument by the
government that the prohibition could survive strict scrutiny (by showing it was
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest).
53
The Federal Circuit then rejected three defenses asserted by the government.
First was a claim that § 2(a) is immune from First Amendment scrutiny because
it does not ban any speech, allowing Tam to use his name for the band.
54 As the
court noted, "'[lawmakers may no more silence unwanted speech by burdening
its utterance than by censoring its content.'[...] '[The government's ability to
impose content-based burdens on speech raises the specter that the government
may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.'' 55 The
denial of the important benefits of trademark registration would have a chilling
effect on speech, such as Tam's band.
56
Second, the government and amici asserted that trademark registration is
speech by the government, allowing the PTO to grant and reject trademarks as
it sees fit.57 This contention was readily dispatched by the Federal Circuit:
Use of a mark by its owner is clearly private speech. Trademarks
identify the source of a product, and are often closely associated
with the actual product. A mark's purpose-to identify the
source of goods-is antithetical to the notion that a trademark is
tied to the government. The fact that COCA COLA and PEPSI
may be registered trademarks does not mean the government has
endorsed these brands of cola, or prefers them over other
brands. We see no reason that a markholder's use of its mark
constitutes government speech.
58
The court also rejected the argument that actions allowing trademark
registration, use of the ® symbol, and placement in the trademark database
somehow constitute government speech, and noted by analogy that it would be
outright censorship for copyright registration to depend upon whether the
5' Id. (citing Vitginia State Board of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765 and RA. V., 505 U.S. at 385).
52 Id.
53 Id. at 1339.
54 Id. at 1340.
55 Id. (quoting Sorrel, 131 S. Ct. at 2664 and Simon &Schuster, 502 U.S. at 116).
56 Id. at 1341-45.
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government viewed copyrighted material as somehow offensive, scandalous, or
disparaging.59 As the court noted,
The PTO's processing of trademark registrations no more
transforms private speech into government speech than when
the government issues permits for street parades, copyright
registration certificates, or, for that matter, grants medical,
hunting, fishing, or drivers licenses, or records property tides,
birth certificates, or articles of incorporation. To conclude
otherwise would transform every act of government registration
into one of government speech and thus allow rampant
viewpoint discrimination. When the government registers a
trademark, it regulates private speech. It does not speak for
itself.
60
The government also asserted that the prohibition only withholds a
government subsidy for Tam's speech, applying the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine:
even though a person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental
benefit and even though the government may deny him the
benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon
which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to
a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected
interests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech.61
Finally, the court found that even if the prohibition was deemed a regulation
of commercial speech, there was no substantial governmental interest in
regulating disparaging speech.62 The court noted that just because trademarks
were commercial in nature does not mean "that all government regulation of
trademarks is properly reviewed under the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny
standard. Section 2(a) bars registration of disparaging marks. This regulation is
squarely based on the expressive aspect of the speech, not its commercial-speech
aspects.'63 Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit proceeded to apply intermediate
scrutiny, first noting that "[u]nlike many other provisions of § 2, the
disparagement provision does not address misleading, deceptive, or unlawful
marks."'64 The court next found that there was no substantial governmental
59 Id. at 1345-46.
60 Id. at 1348.
61 Id. at 1349 (quoting Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).
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interest served by the prohibition, which sought to suppress disfavored
messages.65 As the court summarized: "All of the government's proffered
interests boil down to permitting the government to burden speech it finds
offensive. This is not a legitimate interest. With no substantial government
interests, the disparagement provision of 5 2(a) cannot satisfy the CentralHudson
test."66
As the Federal Circuit noted in its en banc opinion, "Tam and his band weigh
in on cultural and political discussions about race and society that are within the
heartland of speech protected by the First Amendment.'6
7 As the court
concluded: "Whatever our personal feelings about the mark at issue here, or
other disparaging marks, the First Amendment forbids government regulators to
deny registration because they find the speech likely to offend others. Even when
speech 'inflict[s] great pain,' our Constitution protects it 'to ensure that we do
not stifle public debate."'
68
Judges O'Malley and Wallach concurred in the en banc majority opinion, but
also viewed the prohibition as unconstitutionally vague under the First
Amendment.69 Judge Dyk dissented with regard to the facial constitutional
analysis, urging that the statute merely regulated commercial speech and that it
sought "to protect underrepresented groups in our society from being
bombarded with demeaning messages in commercial advertising.'70 He agreed
with the majority, however, that the prohibition was unconstitutional as applied
to Tam because of the expressive nature of his particular trademark.71 Finally,
Judge Lourie and Reyna wrote separate dissents that would uphold the
prohibition on registration of Tam's mark.
72
C. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION AND OPINIONS
The Supreme Court's opinion in Matal v. Tam, 137 S.Ct. 1744 (2017), is
striking in a number of ways.73 Justice Alto announced the judgment of the
Court and delivered a unanimous opinion striking down the prohibition on
65 Id. at 1355-56 (citing Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.,564 U.S. 552, 570-73 (2011); Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69-72 (1983); Carey v. Population Servs., Int'l, 431
U.S. 678, 701 & n. 28 (1977)).
66 Id. at 1357.
67 In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1331.
68 Id. at 1357-78 (quoting Snyder, 562 U.S. at 461).
69 Id. at 1358 (O'Malley, J. concurring).
70 Id. at 1364 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part).
71 Id. at 1373-74 (Dyk, J., concurring in part).
72 Id. at 1374 (Lourie, J., dissenting); Id. at 1376 (Reyna, J., dissenting).
73 See Matal v. Tam, 137 S.Ct. 1744 (2017).
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disparaging marks.74 Specifically, Parts 1, 11, and Ii A of his opinion were joined
by all participating justices.75 Justice Gorsuch did not participate, so this part of
the opinion was a unanimous 8-0 conclusion; the remainder of his opinion, Parts
III-B, 111-C, and IV, were joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and
Justice Breyer.
76
The Court's bottom line ruling stated: "We now hold that this provision
violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. It offends a bedrock
First Amendment principle: Speech may not be banned on the ground that it
expresses ideas that offend. '77
The Court began its analysis with a summary of the development of
trademark protection under state law and the common law, and its eventual
protection under federal law for reasons of national uniformity.7 8 The Court
noted that even without federal registration, a valid trademark may still be used
in commerce and may be enforced under 43(a) of the Lanham Act.7 9 The
Court also noted the importance of federal registration, which confers a variety
of rights and benefits:
Registration on the principal register (1) "serves as 'constructive
notice of the registrant's claim of ownership' of the mark," [B&B
Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1293, 1300
(2015)] (quoting 15 U.S.C. 5 1072); (2) "is 'prima facie evidence
of the validity of the registered mark and of the registration of
the mark, of the owner's ownership of the mark, and of the
owner's exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce
on or in connection with the goods or services specified in the
certificate,' " B & B Hardware, 575 U.S. at -, 135 S.Ct., at
1300 (quoting 1057(b)); and (3) can make a mark "
'incontestable' " once a mark has been registered for five years,"
ibid. (quoting % 1065, 1115(b)); see Park NFyl, 469 U.S., at 193,
105 S.Ct. 658. Registration also enables the trademark holder "to
stop the importation into the United States of articles bearing an
infringing mark." 3 McCarthy 5 19:9, at 19-38; see 15 U.S.C.
1124."80
After addressing a statutory argument made by Tam, Justice Aito turned to




7 Id. at 1751.
78 Id. at 1748.
79 Id. at 1752.
80 Id. at 1753.
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private speech, (2) that trademarks are a form of government subsidy, and (3)
that the constitutionality of the disparagement clause should be tested under a
new 'government-program' doctrine."8'
Addressing the unique category of government speech, the Court noted:
"When a government entity embarks on a course of action, it necessarily takes a
particular viewpoint and rejects others. The Free Speech Clause does not require
government to maintain viewpoint neutrality when its officers and employees
speak about that venture."82
The Court provided illustrations from World War II, including posters to
promote the war effort, such as urging enlistment, purchasing of war bonds, and
conservation of resources.8 3 Justice Alito then noted the fundamental danger
posed by a wide-ranging government speech doctrine: "If private speech could
be passed off as government speech by simply affixing a government seal of
approval, government could silence or muffle the expression of disfavored
viewpoints. For this reason, we must exercise great caution before extending our
government-speech precedents."84
The Court noted that the federal government does not create, edit, or endorse
marks that are proposed for registration, and that it cannot deny registration
based on viewpoint.85  If merely registering a mark renders the mark
governmental, then "the Federal Government is babbling prodigiously and
incoherently. It is saying many unseemly things. It is expressing contradictory
views. It is unashamedly endorsing a vast array of commercial products and
services. And it is providing Delphic advice to the consuming public."
86
Justice Alito proceeded to distinguish the Court's government speech. Johanns
concerned advertisements promoting the sale of beef products that were
approved and sponsored by the Secretary of Agriculture.87 Summum involved a
city-run and funded park contained 15 monuments that had been selected and
approved by the city to be placed on the grounds88 Finally, the closest case to
the present dispute, Walker, "likely marks the outer bounds of the government-
speech doctrine."8 9 Addressing messages on Texas specialty license plates, the
Court noted that license plates are manufactured and designed by the states, and
81 Id. at 1757.
82 Id.




87 Johanns v. Livestock Markeing Assn., 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
88 Pkasant Grove Ciy v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
89 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1760 (2017) (citing Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate
Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).
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they have long been used by the States to convey various state messages.90
Moreover, Texas retained direct control over the messages conveyed on the
plates.91
Trademarks, the Court noted, share none of these characteristics.
92
Trademarks have not traditionally been used to convey a Government message,
and with the exception of the enforcement of 15 U.S.C. 5 1052(a), the viewpoint
expressed by a mark has not played a role in the decision whether to place it on
the principal register.93 And there is no evidence that the public associates the
contents of trademarks with the Federal Government.
94
Thus, the Court determined that "registration of trademarks is vastly different
from the beef ads in Johanns, the monuments in Summum, and even the specialty
license plates in Walker. Holding that the registration of a trademark converts the
mark into government speech would constitute a huge and dangerous extension
of the government-speech doctrine."
95
The Court then expressed its concern that if registration of trademarks was
government speech, then other registration systems could easily be so
characterized: "Perhaps the most worrisome implication of the Government's
argument concerns the system of copyright registration. If federal registration
makes a trademark government speech and thus eliminates all First Amendment
protection, would the registration of the copyright for a book produce a similar
transformation?"'96  Rejecting the Government's attempt to distinguish
copyrights on the ground that they are "the engine of free expression," the Court
noted that trademarks can also have expressive content or convey a message. In
sum, "[t]rademarks are private, not government, speech.
97
To this point, Justice Alito was writing for a unanimous Court. Justice
Kennedy, writing for himself and three other Justices, states in his concurrence
"that the viewpoint discrimination rationale renders unnecessary any extended
treatment of other questions raised by the parties.'9
Justice Alito, writing for four of the eight Justices who heard the case,
proceeded to address a line of cases involving government programs subsidizing
speech that expressed a particular viewpoint.99 As he notes, "we have held that
the Government 'may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his
constitutionally protected ... freedom of speech even if he has no entidement
90 Id. at 2248.
91 See Id. at 2249.






98 Id. at 1765, (KennedyJ. concurring).
99 Matal v. Tam, 137 S.Ct. at 1760.
2019]
15
Myers: Trademarks & The First Amendment After Matal v. Tam
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law,
J. JINJTLL PROP. L
to that benefit."' ' 0 Moreover, each of these cases involved cash subsidies or their
equivalent.1'1
In contrast, Justice Alito noted, federal trademark registration does not
involve funding for applicants; instead applicant must pay the PTO a filing fee,
which ranges $225-$600.102 Those who hold federal registrations must pay a fee
of $300-$500 every ten years in order to maintain the registration.10 3 Indeed,
these payments support the operation of the trademark registration system.
104
Next, the Government argued for a new doctrine applicable to government
programs, citing two cases involving the collection of union dues by a public
employer. Justice Alto viewed these cases as similar to the subsidy cases.'
05
Although there were no cash subsidies to the unions,
they conferred a very valuable benefit-the right to negotiate a
collective-bargaining agreement under which non-members
would be obligated to pay an agency fee that the public employer
would collect and turn over to the union free of charge. As in the
cash subsidy cases, the laws conferred this benefit because it was
thought that this arrangement served important government
interests.106
Justice Alto then addressed cases in which the government created a limited
public forum for private speech.10 7 Although some content- and speaker-based
restrictions may be allowed in these settings, the court has prohibited the
government from engaging in "viewpoint discrimination."10 8 Here, the
10 Id. (quoting Agency for Int'l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205,214
(2013).
1oi Id.; See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173(1991) ("[F]unds [for] private parties for family
planning services'); Nat'l Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569(1998) (cash grants for
artists); United States v. Am. Library Assn., Inc., 539 U.S. 194(2003) ("[flederal funding for
public libraries'); see also Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540(1983);
Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
102 Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1761 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 2.6(a)(1)).
103 § 2.6(a)(5); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1059(a).
104 Matal, 137 S.Ct. at 1749.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 1762 (discussing Davenport v. Washington Ed. Assn., 551 U.S. 177,181-182(2007)
and Ysursa v. Pocatello Ed. Assn., 555 U.S. 353(2009).
107 Id. at 1763 (citing Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98, 106-
107(2001); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831(1995);
Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches union free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S., 384, 392-393).
1M Id. at 1757 (citing Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 831).
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prohibition on any speech that gives offense is, Justice Alito noted, viewpoint
based.1 09
Justice Alito then addressed whether trademarks are commercial speech
analyzed under the more generous standard of Central Hudson Gas & Elc. Cop.
v. Public Sen. Comm'n of N.Y" l0 Although trademarks undoubtedly have
commercial purposes, they can-and often do-also have expressive
components. 1' "The trademark in this case illustrates this point. The name 'The
Slants' not only identifies the band but expresses a view about social issues."112
Justice Alito's opinion did not resolve whether the commercial speech standard
should govern, because he indicated that the disparagement clause fails to meet
the Central Hudson test's requirements that a restriction on speech must serve a
"substantial interest" and must be "narrowly drawn."'1 13
The Government proffered two interests to justify the prohibition. The first,
preventing underrepresented groups from receiving demeaning messages in
commercial advertising, runs counter to the First Amendment, as noted earlier
in the opinion.'1 4 Justice Alito noted: "Speech that demeans on the basis of race,
ethnicity, gender, religion, age, disability, or any other similar ground is hateful;
but the proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the
freedom to express 'the thought that we hate."'115
With regard to the second interest-protecting the orderly flow of commerce
from disruption by disparaging marks-Justice Alito found that the clause is not
narrowly drawn to achieve this result.16 Further, he stated:
There is also a deeper problem with the argument that
commercial speech may be cleansed of any expression likely to
09 Id. at 1763 (citing Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592(1969) ("the public expression
of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of
their hearers."); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414(1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of
an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.'); Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55-56(1988); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611,
615(1971); Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 567(1970); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509-514(1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536,
551(1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237-238(1963); Terminiello v. Chicago,
337 U.S. 1, 4-5(1949); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940); Schneider v. State
(Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365(1937).
110 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
111 Id.
112 Id. at 1764.
113 Id. (citing CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 564-565).
114 Id.
115 Id. (quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655(1929) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)).
116 Id. at 1764-65.
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cause offense. The commercial market is well stocked with
merchandise that disparages prominent figures and groups, and
the line between commercial and non-commercial speech is not
always clear, as this case illustrates. If affixing the commercial
label permits the suppression of any speech that may lead to
political or social "volatility," free speech would be
endangered.
117
As noted previously, Justice Kennedy stated in his concurrence that § 1052(a)
constitutes viewpoint discrimination.1 8 He observed that this is "a form of
speech suppression so potent that it must be subject to rigorous constitutional
scrutiny. The Government's action and the statute on which it is based cannot
survive this scrutiny.'"119 He noted that categories of speech that can be punished
based on viewpoint are well established-such as fraud, defamation, and
incitement.120 Justice Kennedy rejected the government's claim that it was an
equal opportunity censor, precluding all types of offensive speech:
The First Amendment's viewpoint neutrality principle protects
more than the right to identify with a particular side. It protects
the right to create and present arguments for particular positions
in particular ways, as the speaker chooses. By mandating
positivity, the law here might silence dissent and distort the
marketplace of ideas.121
Nor does it matter that the suppression of speech was focused on the
government seeking to address an audience reaction or offense.2 2 Regarding
the issue of trademarks as commercial speech, Justice Kennedy again reiterated
that viewpoint discrimination, even in the commercial context, is inherently
suspect.23 He notes that "marks make up part of the expression of everyday
life, as with the names of entertainment groups, broadcast networks, designer
clothing, newspapers, automobiles, candy bars, toys, and so on."
124
Finally, Justice Kennedy noted the broader import of the holding in the Tam
case:
117 Id. at 1765.






124 Id. at 1768.
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A law that can be directed against speech found offensive to
some portion of the public can be turned against minority and
dissenting views to the detriment of all. The First Amendment
does not entrust that power to the government's benevolence.
Instead, our reliance must be on the substantial safeguards of
free and open discussion in a democratic society.125
Justice Thomas, concurring in part, agreed with Justice Alito's constitutional
analysis and conclusions, writing separately to reiterate his view that restrictions
on commercial speech should be analyzed using strict scrutiny.126 He agreed
with Justice Alito's conclusion that the disparagement clause "is unconstitutional
even under the less stringent test announced in CentralHudson."'27
D. IMPLICATIONS AND COMMENTARY
Much of the academic commentary regarding the intersection between First
Amendment principles and the registration of offensive marks has taken a view
that allows government actors -trademark examiners, with review by the
courts-to determine which marks are or are not entitled to the crucial benefits
of federal trademark law. For example, Professor Rebecca Tushnet, in her
article, "The First Amendment Walks into a Bar: Trademark Protection and Free
Speech," which was written prior to the Supreme Court's unanimous decision,128
makes two fundamental contentions. First, her article contends that the Federal
Circuit decision in In re Tam was "wrongly reasoned even given the Supreme
Court's increased scrutiny of commercial speech regulations, and that to hold
otherwise and preserve the rest of trademark law would require unprincipled
distinctions within trademark law."'1 29 Her broader contention is that "the
Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence has become so expansive as to
threaten basic aspects of the regulatory state; the result of subjecting economic
regulations such as trademark registration to strict First Amendment scrutiny
shows the damage that can be done thereby."'30 This article disputes both of
these propositions.
125 Id. at 1769.
126 See Id. at 1769 (citing Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 572(2001) (THOMAS,
J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517
U.S. 484, 518(1996).
127 Id.
128 Rebecca Tushnet, THE FIRST AMENDMENT WALKS INTO A BAR: TRADEMARK
PROTECTION AND FREE SPEECH, 92 Notre Dame L Rev. 381 (2016); see also Ned Snow, FREE
SPEECH & DISPARAGING TRADEMARKS, 55 B.C L Rev. 1639 (2016).




Myers: Trademarks & The First Amendment After Matal v. Tam
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law,
J. INTELL PROP. L
With regard to Tushnet's First Amendment argument, she views the issuance
of a trademark registration as a sufficient endorsement of the mark to allow the
government to be the arbiter of the scope of proper trademark discourse:
the government could express an opinion about what the
boundaries of appropriate public discourse are, and it could
accept both Apple and Microsoft as contenders, just as it can
approve a no-pets restrictive covenant and an all-pets-allowed
covenant for a residential community because both are rational.
Allowing a particular plate, or a particular mark, expresses only
the opinion that it's appropriate for its environment, without
saying that it's correct.
131
Yet, as noted above, this is precisely what the First Amendment prevents the
government from doing--determining the boundaries of public discourse. And
the Supreme Court - without dissent - agreed with this proposition.
132
Next, Tushnet states:
If the government endorsement argument fails, however, the
next standard justification for refusing disparaging marks
registration is persuasive. The [disparagement] bar doesn't save
government resources, because it takes a lot of judicial and
administrative resources to enforce section 2(a). Also, if section
43(a) of the Lanham Act remains available to protect against
confusing uses of unregistered disparaging marks, then
government resources are still being devoted to protecting such
marks.133
Again, the Federal Circuit's analysis on this point is more persuasive, and the
Supreme Court agreed.
Tushnet then makes the following argument:
The third justification for the disparagement bar, lack of effect
on the ability or right to use the mark, is the most complicated
and also ultimately the strongest.... [I]here's still nothing
stopping anyone, including the Washington football team, from
using a disparaging term on a T-shirt or uniform and thus there
is no cognizable harm inflicted on them. Although the
131 Id. at 392.
132 See Matal v. Tam, 137 S.Ct. 1744 (2017).
133 Tushnet, supra note 128, at 393.
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government can rarely suppress speech based on its content, it
also isn't required to support or facilitate in amplifying the reach
of privately produced disparaging content.134
On the contrary, one of the weaker arguments ever proposed for denying
trademark protection based on government fiat is that the owner of the mark is
not totally prohibited from making use of the mark- it is only being denied the
crucial benefits of the Lanham Act. Those benefits were highlighted in Judge
Moore's en banc Federal Circuit opinion:
The holder of a federal trademark has a right to exclusive
nationwide use of that mark where there was no prior use by
others. See 15 U.S.C. % 1072, 1115. Because the common law
grants a markholder the right to exclusive use only in the
geographic areas where he has actually used his mark, see 5 J.
Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair
Competition § 26:32 (4th ed.) (hereinafter "McCarthy"), holders
of a federally registered trademark have an important substantive
right they could not otherwise obtain. Also, a registered mark is
presumed to be valid, 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b), and the mark becomes
incontestable (with certain exceptions) after five years of
consecutive post-registration use, id. § 1065; see also B & B
Hardware, 135 S.Ct. at 1310 ("Incontestability is a powerful
protection.'). A markholder may sue in federal court to enforce
his trademark, 15 U.S.C. § 1121, and he may recover treble
damages if he can show infringement was willful, id. § 1117. He
may also obtain the assistance of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection in restricting importation of infringing or counterfeit
goods, id. § 1124, 19 U.S.C. § 1526, and qualify for a simplified
process for obtaining recognition and protection of his mark in
countries that have signed the Paris Convention, see id. § 1141b
(Madrid Protocol); Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property art. 6 quinquies, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T.
1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305. Lastly, registration operates as a
complete defense to state or common law claims of trademark
dilution.135
As the court further elaborated, "while it is true that a trademark owner may
use its mark in commerce even without federal registration, it has been widely
134 Id. at 394.
135 In reTam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1328-29 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc).
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recognized that federal trademark registration bestows truly significant and
financially valuable benefits upon markholders."1
36
Next, Professor Tushnet analyzes the unconstitutional conditions doctrine,
acknowledging that it "is a enormous hairball. '137 The heart of her analysis is the
following:
Because the trademark function can be separated from the other
communicative functions of a symbol, it may be regulated
without having harmful effects on those other functions. While
the Tam majority saw section 2(a) as regulating based on the
expressive, not the commercial, elements of speech, the majority
had it backwards. The content of expression is important to
figuring out if a symbol is capable of being a trademark, but
denying trademark rights regulates only the commercial aspects
of the speaker's message. If the trademark owner wants to
communicate other things about itself (including "we wish to
insult Native Americans" or "we wish to reclaim a slur"), it can
use other symbols in conjunction with its mark."'
1 38
Again, Tushnet misses the expressive nature of the mark in question,
something recognized by both the majority and the three-judge partial
concurrence in the Tam Federal Circuit en banc decision, as well as by the Supreme
Court; merely repackages the argument that a rejected trademark owner can
express itself in other ways and interprets the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine in an overly narrow way.
It is clearly established that content-based burdens on protected expression
are subject to the same constitutional scrutiny as outright bans on speech. As
the Supreme Court noted in United States v. Playbqy Entertainment Group., Inc., "[t]he
distinction between laws burdening and laws banning speech is but a matter of
degree. The Government's content-based burdens must satisfy the same rigorous
136 Id. at 1340 (citing B &B Hardware, 135 S.Ct. at 1300; Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park &
Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1985) (valuable new rights were created by the Lanham Act);
McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, at 5 19:9, 19:11 (5th ed. 2018)
("Registration of a mark on the federal Principal Register confers a number of procedural and
substantive legal advantages over reliance on common law rights ... Registration on the
Principal Register should be attempted if it is at all possible.").
137 Rebecca Tushnet, "The First Amendment Walks into a Bar: Trademark Registration and
Free Speech," 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 381 (2016), at 395.
138 Id. at 396-97.
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scrutiny as its content-based bans."'1 39 Hence, "[l]awmakers may no more silence
unwanted speech by burdening its utterance than by censoring its content."14
III. ANALYSIS
A. THE DISPARAGING, IMMORAL & SCANDALOUS PROHIBITIONS OF
SECTION 2 ARE CONTENT-BASED IN VIOLATION OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
"Content-based laws-those that target speech based on its communicative
content-are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the
government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state
interests.'141 As noted in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley,142 "the First
Amendment means that the government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.143 As the
Federal Circuit noted, "Viewpoint-based regulations, targeting the substance of
the viewpoint expressed, are even more suspect."'144 Therefore, "[t]he First
Amendment requires heightened scrutiny whenever the government creates 'a
regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys. "'145
The prohibition on registration of disparaging marks, as well as those with
immoral or scandalous content, cannot be squared with the First Amendment.
Thus, beyond the issue the Supreme Court addressed when it ruled in Matal v.
Tam-whether the disparagement clause is contrary to the First Amendment-
the restrictions on immoral and scandalous marks should be struck down for
similar reasons. On this point, Professor Tushnet is correct-those restrictions
cannot be distinguished from the disparagement provision.146 As Professor
Snow notes,147 all of these prohibitions are long-standing, but they have not
received serious analysis under modern U.S. free speech doctrines. When so
analyzed, as noted above and as found by the Supreme Court, they violate the
First Amendment.148 The Federal Circuit has now reached that conclusion in In
139 529 U.S. 803, 812 (2000).
140 Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2664; see also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828 ("mhe government offends
the First Amendment when it imposes financial burdens on certain speakers based on the
content of their expression.").
141 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992)).
142 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
143 Id.
144 In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1334-35.
14' Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
146 See Lantham Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. §1052 (2012).
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re Bruneti.149 Brunetti appealed from a decision by the Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board affirming an examiner's refusal to register the mark "FUCT" on
grounds that it was immoral or scandalous under the Lanham Act.
150 The court
found that the mark was immoral or scandalous, but held that the prohibition on
registering immoral or scandalous marks violated the First Amendment in light
of Matal v. Tam.'5l
Most importantly, for purposes of any possible revision of trademark law to
comport with First Amendment principles, the Bruneti court rejected the
argument that it could narrowly construe the statute to prohibit only obscene
marks: "It is not reasonable to construe the words immoral and scandalous as
confined to obscene material. There is no dispute that an obscene mark would
be scandalous or immoral; however, not all scandalous or immoral marks are
obscene. All apples are fruit, but not all fruits are apples."5 2 It seems the court
is again correct that a narrowing construction is not plausible in light of the
language and prior case law interpreting this prohibition.15 3 Thus, the court
concluded that it "cannot stand in the shoes of the legislature and rewrite a
statute."154 Such a rewriting would, it seems, need to be the result of
congressional action, as discussed below.
As this article goes to press, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari and
will review the Brunetli decision. Based on the analysis above, the Court should
affirm the Federal Circuit, as its ruling in Brunefti is entirely consistent with the
Court's decision in Tam. A discussion of an alternative ground for affirming -
based upon a claim that the scandalous or immoral prohibition is
unconstitutionally vague, is beyond the scope of this article.
55
Another area of constitutional infirmity is the Lanham Act prohibition on
registration of marks that "may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with ...
beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute .... "156
To the extent this provision seems to preclude the registration of marks based
on their viewpoint - disparaging a belief or a national symbol - it would be
flawed under the First Amendment. A comparison can be drawn to the well-
known flag-burning case, Texas v. Johnson.157 In that case, the Supreme Court
149 In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
150 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).
151 In reBruneti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
152 Id. at 1355-56.
'53 Id. at 1356.
154 Id. at 1357.
155 See 2019 Westlaw 98541 January 4, 2019).
1- 15 U.S.C. 1052(a) (2018).
157 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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held that laws prohibiting flag burning do not pass muster under the First
Amendment.
58
As noted above, some commentators have predicted that a broad First
Amendment ruling would undermine nearly all of trademark law's limitations on
registration.5 9 On the contrary, the other prohibitions found in the Lanham
Act, such as those which preclude deceptive marks, confusingly similar marks,
personal names, governmental insignia, and functional marks, can be defended
based upon traditional trademark principles that are consistent with a robust First
Amendment.
Deceptive and confusingly similar marks can still be barred, as restrictions on
registration of deceptive speech that do not violate the First Amendment.60 The
same conclusion is likely to hold as to matter that falsely suggests an association
with national symbols.
Justice Kennedy's concurrence addressed some of the implications of Tam.
As he noted, "to the extent a trademark is confusing or misleading the law can
protect consumers and trademark owners. ' 161 Consumer protection laws more
generally are also lawful, so long as they do not involve viewpoint
discrimination.62 These laws clearly serve a consumer protection function and
do not discriminate based on viewpoint.
The prohibition on registration of governmental insignia precludes a mark
that "[c]onsists of or comprises the flag or coat of arms or other insignia of the
United States, or of any State or municipality, or of any foreign nation, or any
simulation thereof."'1 63 This prohibition might initially seem to pose First
Amendment concern. The most relevant prior case on this point is San -Franisco
Arts &Athleics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, in which the Supreme Court
held that an athletic association does not have a First Amendment right to use
the word "Olympic" to promote athletic events in light of the United States
Olympic Committee's property right in the exclusive use of the word
158 Id.
159 See Snow, supra note 128.
160 In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc); see Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) ("The government may ban forms of
communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it."); see also Friedman v.
Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13, 15-16 (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 462-63
(1978).
161 Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1768 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co.,
258 U.S. 483, 493 (1922) ("The labels in question are literally false, and ... palpably so. All are,
as the Commission found, calculated to deceive and do in fact deceive a substantial portion of
the purchasing public").
162 See Tam, 137 S. Ct.at 1768 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("This case also does not involve
laws related to product labeling or otherwise designed to protect consumers.") (citing Sorrell,
supra, at 579, 131 S. Ct. 2653).
163 15 U.S.C. § 1052(b).
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"Olympic."'1 64 The Court rejected the claim despite the expressive, as opposed
to a purely commercial, purpose in using the word "Olympic" by the sponsors
of what was then called the "Gay Olympics."' 65 Applying the reasoning of this
case to the broad prohibition on registration of governmental insignia, it could
be argued that allowing registration of such marks would create a likelihood of
confusion or association with the relevant governmental entity. Under this
rationale, this prohibition is likely to withstand scrutiny.
Similarly, a prohibition on registering marks that adopts the name of a person
can be squared with the First Amendment. In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., the Supreme Court held that a right of publicity claim involving
appropriation of a "human cannonball" act was not barred by The First
Amendment.66 This ruling would suggest that the general right of a person to
prevent appropriation of their name or other identifiers for
commercial/trademark purposes would be upheld against a First Amendment
challenge. The Lanham Act provision, which prohibits registration of a mark
that "may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead"
is broad, but arguably permissible as a way to protect the right of publicity and
reputation of individuals.
167
Functional aspects of a product do not fall within the ambit of speech, and
thus are not subject to First Amendment scrutiny because in essence they do not
involve speech at all. Further, the Lanham Act's prohibition on the use of
governmental insignia can be squared with the First Amendment in light of San
Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee,168 as discussed
above.
In short, contrary to the view of some commentators, most of the reasonable
restrictions on registration found in trademark law would remain in place after
the First Amendment analysis proposed here. What the Supreme Court has
effectively struck down are the Victorian prohibitions found in section 2(a) of
the Lanham Act. These provisions could be revised in a manner that would be
consistent with the First Amendment. Specifically, the Lanham Act could
preclude the registration of marks that are deemed to be obscene under
traditional First Amendment analysis.
With regard to obscenity, Miller v. Caifornia stated: "This much has been
categorically settled by the Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the
16 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
165 San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522,
525(1987).
1- 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
167 15 U.S.C. 1052(a) (2017).
168 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
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First Amendment."1 69 The regulation of obscenity is limited, however, to "works
which depict or describe sexual conduct. That conduct must be specifically
defined by the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively construed.170
More specifically, obscenity involves only "works which, taken as a whole, appeal
to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently
offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value. '171 The Millr Court proceeded to establish its now
traditional three-part test:
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary
community standards' would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest, (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value.
172
Applying the traditional test found in Miller v. California to trademark law, it would
be permissible for the Lanham Act to be amended to prohibit obscene marks as
defined above. The language can be drawn from the Miller test itself.
Similarly, in the line of cases based on New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,173 and
its progeny, the Court addressed circumstances in which defamatory content can
be penalized. There is a complex array of rules in this line of cases, which
distinguish between types of targets of defamation (public officials and public
figures versus private individuals),174 types of subject matter (matters of public
concern versus matters that are not of public concern),175 and levels of fault
(actual malice, negligence, or strict liability). 176
The complex constitutional rules governing defamation would make
fashioning a rule precluding the registration of defamatory trademarks rather
difficult. The framework could be established by a series of court decisions
construing these disparagement prohibitions using a set of rules fashioned from
the New York Times v. Sullivan line of cases. A central point is that group libel is
not actionable, and thus the Lanham Act could not simply adopt a prohibition
169 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
170 Id. at 24.
171 Id.
172 Id. (citations omitted).
173 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
174 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,
497 U.S. 1(1990).
175 See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749(1985).
176 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Masson v. New Yorker Magazine,
Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991)
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on registering marks that defame a group (such as an ethnic group), as opposed
to a single or small number of individuals.
Finally, fighting words and incitement are forms of speech that can be
constitutionally penalized under First Amendment jurisprudence. This principle
can be found in cases such as R-A. V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn.,1
77 Chaplinsky v. State
of New Hampshire,178 and Brandenburg v. Ohio.179 It seems unlikely, however, that a
trademark could pose the imminent threat of harm necessary in order to be
deemed constitutionally unprotected.
Another important area of concern involves the issue of whether Matalv. Tam
might undermine the scope of trademark protection for "famous" marks under
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act ("FTDA.1 80 Relevant statutory provisions
state that "the owner of a famous mark that is distinctive, inherently or through
acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an injunction against another person
who, at any time after the owner's mark has become famous, commences use of
a mark or trade name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or
dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of the presence or
absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic
injury."'181 The statute essentially provides for two types of claims - dilution by
blurring and by tarnishment. The blurring claims are likely to survive scrutiny
based on the reasoning of San Frandsco Arts &Athletics, Inc. v. United States Oympic
Committee,182 as discussed above in the context of trademark protection for
governmental insignia and for the "Olympics" mark. Once a mark has attained
sufficient fame to be protected under the dilution statute, it is entitled to
protection from other commercial uses that would blur its distinctiveness. The
tarnishment claim is probably most analogous to the defamation analysis
discussed above, and some potential might exist for a First Amendment
challenge in that context. It is probably only in this area that the ability to bring
a dilution claim might be affected by the constitutional analysis of Matal v. Tam.
At the same time, if famous marks can constitutionally be given protection
against confusingly similar uses and uses that cause dilution of their
distinctiveness, then commercial uses that might tarnish the trademark would
seem to also be precluded. As an example, if Exxon is protected from trademark
infringement if a competing oil company used a similar name and from dilution
if the Exxon mark was used to sell pianos, then it would seem to also follow that
Exxon could prevent its mark from being used to sell sex toys or pornography.
177 505 U.S. 377, 408 (1992).
178 315 U.S. 568, 769 (1942).
179 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969).
180 Lanham Trade-Mark Act, §§ 43(c)(1), 45,15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1), 1127.
181 15 U.S.C. §1125(C) (2012).
182 107 S. Ct. 2971 (1987).
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B. POST-TAM COMMENTARY
In his article, entitled, "The Hybrid Trademark and Free Speech Right Forged
from Matal v. Tam," Timothy T. Hsieh addresses whether the ruling will lead to
a flood of filings for offensive marks. His prediction is "that there will not be a
substantial increase in offensive mark filings, due to goodwill concerns and
common business sense. Additionally, the fact that the Disparagement Clause
survived for nearly seventy years despite major First Amendment concerns
suggests that issues with disparaging marks are relatively uncommon."183 In
general, Hsieh is certainly correct that most trademark owners do not seek to use
these types of marks to represent hem in the marketplace. There are, however,
a number of categories of parties that are likely to desire to register offensive or
disparaging marks - (1) those who sell products of a sexual nature or other types
of products for which an offensive term might be suitable; (2) those seeking to
market a product for its shock value, such as a t-shirt with an offensive term on
it; (3) those, like Mr. Tam, who seek to reclaim disparaging terms; and (4) those
who seek affirmatively to give offense or disparage.184 This last category of
speakers were the natural targets of the Lanham Act's prohibitions, but the Tam
ruling clearly establishes that they cannot be singled out for censorship, however
offensive their intentions might be.185
Moreover, it is likely that efforts to register offensive or disparaging marks
were rare because applicants and their attorneys were well aware of the Lanham
Act's prohibitions on them. Thus, such efforts to register were probably often
deterred by the likelihood that examiners would reject the marks, and that those
decisions would be upheld on appeal.
One way in which to examine this prediction is to assess whether a
meaningful number of trademark applications have been filed that might have
been rejected in the past. The author of this article conducted a search of the
US PTO website to see if there were any recent trademark applications that
contained two of the famous George Carlin "seven dirty words" - shit and
piss.186 The Carlin monologue became famous in legal circles for leading to the
Supreme Court decision in Federal Communications Commission v. Paifica
Foundation,187 which held that the FCC had the power to regulate "indecent"
material when it was transmitted on broadcast television. In fact, a number of
183 Id. at 19.
184 In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1349 ("trademarks-including immoral or scandalous
trademarks also 'often have an expressive content.' For immoral or scandalous marks, this
message is often uncouth. But it can espouse a powerful cause.") (quoting Tam, 137 S. Ct. at
1760).
15 See Matal, 137 S.Ct. at 1760.
186 Georgia Carlin, Seven Words You Can Never Say on Television, Class Clown (Atlantic
Records 1972).
187 438 U.S 726 (1978).
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trademarks have been filed since the ruling in Tam. For example, marks using
these two of George Carlin's "seven dirty words" include:
I SMOKE CIGARS TO PISS YOU OFF, filed August 6, 2018
RUNS ON BALD EAGLE PISS AND FREEDOM, filed
January 22, 2018
PISSPERFECT, filed August 22, 2017
PISS TEST, filed February 18, 2018
IT'S LIFE... SHIT HAPPENS, August 3, 2018
NO POOR SHIT, August 2,2018
DO AWESOME SHIT, July 19, 2018
These marks and many other examples can be found on the USPTO website,
uspto.gov. Although a comprehensive survey of these patterns is beyond the
scope of this article, it does appear that trademark applicants are seeking to
register marks that might previously have been questioned or challenged on
grounds of disparagement, immorality, or scandalousness.
Mark Conrad, in his article, "Matal v. Tam - A Victory for the Slants, A
Touchdown for the Redskins, But an Ambiguous Journey for the First
Amendment and Trademark Law,' 81 8 notes that Matal v. Tam "ends the use of
trademark law to bar speech that is offensive and disparaging. However, it did
not close the book on the tension between government regulation of intellectual
property and free speech, as it did not resolve a deeper doctrinal question of the
kind of First Amendment protection accorded trademarks."'8 9 Conrad focuses
on the fact that the two main opinions in the case (written by Justices Alito and
Kennedy) do not address the underlying issue of whether the "commercial
speech" doctrine applies to trademarks in some, none, or all circumstances.
Conrad is correct that these opinions did not address this question, although it
sufficiently established the core principle that the registration of trademarks -
like most government action - cannot be based on the government's approval
188 Mark Conrad, Matal v. Tam - A Victory for the Slants, a Touchdown for the Redskins,
but an Ambiguous Journey for the First Amendment and Trademark Law, 36 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 83, 147 (2018).
189 Id. at 147 (emphasis in the original).
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or disapproval of the viewpoint of the trademark holder.1 90 This principle
provides guidance in many types of cases in which trademarks might be analyzed.
Conrad suggests that courts should "create an inference of constitutional
protection unless the mark is 'strictly' commercial."'1 91 Under this approach,
section 2(a)'s prohibitions could still be upheld in the case of purely commercial
trademarks. The difficulty with this argument is that marks can readily be found
to have at least some expressive element. Consider the four previously discussed
categories of marks likely to be proposed for registration in light of Matalv. Tam:
(1) those who sell products of a sexual nature or other types of products for
which an offensive term might be suitable; (2) those seeking to market a product
for its shock value, such as a t-shirt with an offensive term on it; (3) those, like
Mr. Tam, who seek to reclaim disparaging terms; and (4) those who seek
affirmatively to give offense or disparage.1 92 The only category of mark that could
arguably be deemed purely commercial would be the first group of marks, and
yet even these contain some expressive element. The seller of a sexually-oriented
product is likely to be able to establish that using a highly suggestive or offensive
term was an expressive choice. Those seeking to register a mark for its shock
value, to reclaim a disparaging term, or to give offense/disparage are clearly
seeking to make an expressive use of their marks, thus placing them squarely
within the logic and reasoning of Matal v. Tam.193 In short, it will be a rare case
indeed where a mark would be deemed purely commercial.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article contends that First Amendment principles do allow for most of
the statutory limitations placed on trademark registration, but that the Lanham
Act rules against immoral, scandalous, and disparaging marks are no longer
enforceable and could be redrafted - in much narrower form by Congress
based on speech considerations. Under modern free speech doctrines, each of
these three prohibitions were properly deemed unconstitutional under United
States law. On the other hand, the prohibitions against registration of confusingly
similar marks, deceptive marks, government insignia, personal names, and
functional terms should survive First Amendment scrutiny. In addition,
trademark owners should be able to continue to prevent commercial uses of
marks based on principles of trademark infringement through a likelihood of
confusion and based on dilution of famous marks through either blurring or
190 Id.
191 Id. at 146.
192 In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1349 ("trademarks-including immoral or scandalous
trademarks-also 'often have an expressive content.' For immoral or scandalous marks, this
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tarnishment. Essentially, the overlay of First Amendment analysis can be applied
in each of these areas. Contrary to the suggestion of some commentators, Matal
v. Tam will not upend traditional trademark doctrines in these areas. It will,
however, end the practice of governmental censorship of trademark registrations
based on the perceived potential offense that the mark might cause and other
similar morality-based objections. As the Supreme Court noted in Matal,
"[s]peech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that
offend."1
94
194 Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1751.
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